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CONFLICTS OF THE LAW OF TORTS
IN WISCONSIN
DAVID J. SCHOETZ, L.L.B.
I. INTRODUCTION
Progressive evolution of a particular legal field is typified in the
treatment of Conflicts issues by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. By
no means has the field been completely covered," since many factual
situations involving multiple state activity have not arisen, but through
the demonstrable consequences and inferences of cases already decided,
it is safe to aver that a 1930 admonition that Wisconsin assume leader-
ship in following the theses of the American Law Institute has gener-
ally been effective, although not through the legislative method ad-
vocated? Any complete treatment on Conflict of Laws3 would neces-
sitate a thorough investigation into all jurisdictions, but such is not
the purpose of this article. This brief excursion into the torts field
will attempt to answer where we have been and where we are; this
paper seeks to supply the need of the Wisconsin practioner who has
little time to explore this terrain, who is suddenly confronted with
such a case, and who is puzzled by Chief Justice Winslow's comment
in 1914:
"That field of law which goes by the name of the conflict of
laws is one of the most thorny and difficult fields to traverse. It
is full of conflicting decisions, refined reasoning, and unsatis-
factory results". 4
II. HISTORY
The journey travelled by the Wisconsin court in the development
of its present conclusions in this difficult field has been marked by
conflicting decisions and variances with settled principles. An 1873
recognition5 that an action in tort for an injury inflicted in another
state was transitory, was rejected in 1875,- and the principle was not
reestablished until 1904Y Our court has at one time imposed the
'Wisconsin Annotations, Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1937).
2 15 Mrq. L. Rev. 37, 41 (1930).
3 Cheatham, Dowling, Goodrich, Cases and Materials on Conflict of Laws (2d
ed. 1941); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (2d ed. 1938); Lorenzen, Cases on
Conflict of Laws (4th ed. 1937); Stumberg, Conflict of Laws (1937) ; Beale,
Conflict of Laws (1935) ; Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) ; Dicey, Con-
flict of Laws (5th ed. 1932); Story, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws
(1834).
4 Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Adams, 155 Wis. 335, 337, 144
N.W. 1108 (1914).
5 Curtis v. Bradford, 33 Wis. 190 (1873).
6 Anderson v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Rwy. Co., 37 Wis. 321 (1875).1 Bain v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 94 Wis. 191, 68 N.W. 661 (1896).
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English "double standard" 8 and rejected entirely the doctrine of
forum non conveniens. 9 There often has been a reluctance to use the
lex loci delicti, 0 although the court has recognized the axiom, "The
place of wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal
injury";" where no foreign law has been proved, the court has pre-
sumed that the lex fori and the lex loci delicti have been the same, 2
yet before the passage of Section 328 of Wisconsin Statutes,13 the
court has taken judicial notice of a non-pleaded foreign statute. 4
During the recent session of the Legislature, the Uniform Judicial
Notice of Foreign Law Act was adopted so that the court was re-
quired to take judicial notice of the common law and the statutes
of every state, territory, or other jurisdiction of the United States.5
Fortunately the major detours have been traversed because the court
has evolved a system in accordance with the majority viewpoint on
this complex subject.
The language of the Wisconsin court in 1873 recognized our present
rule in the following language:"
"It further appears that the principal suit was brought to re-
cover for injuries to the plaintiff's wife while attempting to get
aboard the defendant's cars at a station in Michigan. It was
doubtless an action sounding in tort, for an injury inflicted in
another state, but still one transitory in its character and triable
by the courts of this state ... Those authoriites established the
doctrine that courts of general jurisdiction entertain actions for
personal injuries even where the act complained of was com-
mitted in another state"Y
8 Bettys v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Rwy. Co., 37 Wis. 323 (1875). In England, a
tort committed abroad must fulfill two conditions to be actionable. "In the
first place, the wrong must be of such a character that it would have been
actionable if committed in England; and secondly, the act must not have beenjustifiable by the law of the place where it was committed." Carr v. Francis
Times & Co., (1902) A.C. 176, 182.9 Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Rwy. Co. v. McGinley, 175 Wis. 565, 185 N.W.
218 (1922) ; State ex rel. Smith v. Belden, 205 Wis. 158, 236 N.W. 542 (1931).
10 "When the decisions of another state are offered in evidence to prove the law
of that state the point decided is what is proven as law, and argument, illus-
tration, wit, humor, or philosophy which may be found in such decision may
be considered harmlss surplusage." Ruck v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul
Rwy. Co., 153 Wis. 158, 140 N.W. 1074 (1913). In White v. Minneapolis, St.
P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co., 147 Wis. 141, 133 N.W. 148 (1911), the court held that
Illinois law governed the case, yet cited thirty-four Wisconsin cases compared
to two Illinois decisions.
13 Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934), sec. 378.
12 MacCarthy v. Whitcomb, 110 Wis. 113, 85 N.W. 707 (1901).
'a For application, see: Hutzler v. McDonnell, 239 Wis. 568. 2 N.W. (2d) 207
(1942), afiirmed on rehearing, 242 Wis. 256, 7 N.W. (2d) 835 (1943).
14 Gebhart v. Holmes, 149 Wis. 428, 447, 135 N.W. 860 (1912).
15 See: Chapter 363, Wisconsin Laws of 1947.
16 ,But the cause of action is transitory and citizens of other states have the
same right to bring such action here as citizens of Wisconsin have." Burestom
,. Bourestom, 231 Wis. 666, 670, 285 N.W. 426 (1939).
"7 Curtis v. Bradford, supra.
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But two years later,18 in causes of action arising from statutory
rights conferred by foreign states, the Wisconsin court held that an
action for personal injury was governed by the lex fori, arguing that
a person suing in this state must take the law as he finds it, and citing
English cases not directly in point.19 The cases from 1875 to 190420
demonstrated that the English "double standard" was applied only to
those cases where the cause of action in the lex loci delicti arose from
a statutory right, because tort cases based on common law principles
were actionable in our courts; where the lex loci delicti was neither
pleaded nor proved, our court presumed the conditions of the "double
standard" were fulfilled, by applying the statutory law of the forum
to a tort action arising in another state.2 ' The position during this
period, however, proved unsystematic and inconsistent, and in 1904
the court reconsidered the entire phase of law and concluded:
"We cannot avoid the conclusion that the statement that a
personal right of action for a personal injury is governed by
the lex fori, as applied to anything but the manner of enforce-
ment, was inconsiderately made, and should be corrected, to the
end that it may stand in our Reports in apparent conflict with
the law as recognized everywhere else, and as applied by this
court in at least tacit repudiation2 of that statement. That case
may doubtless stand as authority for what was in fact decided,
namely, that the courts of this state may refuse to enforce even
a personal cause of action which depends on the statute of
another state radically different from the law in this, and re-
pugnant to our public policy". 23
This language served the purpose of clarifying the general doctrine
together with the public policy qualification. 24 After the Bain case,
the Wisconsin court has consistently agreed with the basic theory of
the majority that the place of wrong determines whether a person
has sustained a legal injury; capacity, rights and liabilities are now
IsAnderson v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Rwy. Co., supra; Bettys v. Milwaukee
& St. Paul Rwy. Co., supra.
19 1943 Wis. L. Rev. 145, 152 (1943).
20 Stetler v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 49 Wis. 609, 6 N.W. 303 (1880).
Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Co., 94 Wis. 70, 68 N.W. 664, 34 L.R.A. 503
(1896).
21 MacCarthy v. Whitcomb, supra. The court actually enforced a foreign statute
by presuming the Illinois statute was the same as the Wisconsin statute; this
presumption, in fact, was correct.
22 The court here referred to the Eingartner case, supra, which distinguished
rather than repudiated the Anderson case, supra.23 Bain v. Northern Pacific R. Co., supra.
24 Fox v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 138 Wis. 648, 120 N. W. 399 (1909). Here
the defendant telegraph company negligently delayed delivery of a telegram
sent by the plaintiff from New York to Illinois. The Wisconsin court allowed
the plaintiff to recover despite a provision in the telegraph blank recognizable




governed by the law where the tort takes place to an extent that all
criteria for choice of law in torts25 are ignored except the "territorial
basis of law".2
III. PLEADINGS AND PROOF
27
It would be too great a burden on our courts to demand that they
learn the procedure and the machinery for administering justice of
every jurisdiction where a wrong takes place. Rules of evidence within
a single jurisdiction are sufficiently difficult and involved without re-'
quiring the judge and lawyers to employ the rules of a foreign juris-
diction in a conflicts case; questions as to burden of proof fall within
this burdensome category. These are procedural matters determined in
Wisconsin by the law of the forum. The need for keeping the calen-
dars clear and the requirement for certainty recommend this classi-
fication.
Courts are unanimous in the requirement that the foreign law be
pleaded by the party who desires to rely thereon. But the process
of proving a foreign law raises a number of disputable interesting
questions. If the foreign law is to control, and if the court does not
know it judicially, it must be proved the same as any other fact in
issue. 28 When the injured plaintiff relies on the common law of the
place of wrong, a presumption is raised by the Wisconsin court that
the lex loci delicti is the same as the lex fori.25 When the injured
plaintiff relies on the statutes of the place of wrong, the Wisconsin
court takes judicial notice of the statutes of the United States and
all the states and territories thereof.3 0
"The accident happened in the state of Illinois and the liabil-
ity of the parties is therefore to be determined in accordance
with the law of the state of Illinois. The plaintiff in his com-
plaint set out the statutory law of Illinois relating to damages
...but made no allegation respecting the common law of the
state of Illinois, nor was any proof offered upon the trial with
respect to the common law of the state of Illinois. The courts
25 David F. Cavers, "A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem," 47 Harv. L.
Rev. 173 (1933) ; Lorenzen, "Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws," 47 Law
Quarterly Rev. 483 (1931).
26 See opinion of Holmes J. in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213
U.S. 347, 29 Sup. Ct. 511, 53 L. Ed. 826 (1909) ; Goodrich, "Public Policy in
the Law of Conflicts," 36 W. Va. L. Q. 156 (1930).
27 In general, see: Samuel R. Wachtell, "Proof of Foreign Law in American
Courts," (United States L. Rev. 1935, LXIX, 526) ; Chapters 263 and 327,
Wis. Stats. (1945) ; Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) secs. 564, 668, 690, 1213,
1218, 1271, 1680, 1684, 1703, 1697, 1953, 2536, 2558; '43 Wis. L. Rev. 145, 170(1943); '44 Wis. L. Rev. 128 (1944).
28 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) secs. 2536, 2558.
9 Jensen v. Jensen, 228 Wis. 77, 279 N.W. 628 (1938); White v. Minneapolis,
St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co., 147 Wis. 141, 133 N.W. 148 (1911).30 Section 328.01,, Wis. Stats. (1945) ; 1945 Wis. L. Rev. 192, 196 (1945) ; Hutzler
v. McDonnell, 239 Wis. 568, 2 N.W. (2d) 207 (1942), affirmed in 242 Wis. 256,
7 N.W. (2d) 835 (1943).
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of this state take judicial notice of the statutes of the United
States and of all the states and territories thereof. This, how-
ever, does not apply to the common law. If a party claims that
his rights are to be determined in accordance with the law of
another state, the law of that other state must be pleaded and
proven as any other fact; otherwise the common law of the
state where the injury occurred will be presumed to be the same
as the law of the forum".31
Should the injured plaintiff fail to plead the lex loci delicti, he
may amend his pleadings at any time to conform with the issue really
tried.3
We thus see that a right based on statutory liability in the lex loci
delicti has been treated much differently than a common law right of
action. Until passage of the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law
Act in 1947,33 we had this distinction in Wisconsin: the foreign statute
was a matter of "law" to be determined by the judge ;34 the foreign
common law was a matter of "fact" to be determined by the jury.35
Whether or not a foreign statute must be pleaded is not clear,86 but
a cautious counsel, relying on such statute, will not omit such allega-
tion from his pleadings. No grave problems of proving the foreign
statute are involved because the trial court must abide by Section
328.01, Wisconsin Statutes, although it is under no compulsion under
the "full faith and credit" clause of the Act of CongressYn
In all cases where the right of action is based on foreign common
law, counsel for plaintiff should affirmatively plead and prove such
common law, although the Uniform Act requires the court to take
judicial notice. The newness of the Uniform Act requires caution.
And if counsel for defendant sets up an affirmative defense recog-
nized by the lex loci delicti, he has the burden of pleading and proving
such defense.38  Expert witnesses, not necessarily members of the
legal profession,39 should be brought in to testify as to the common
law of the place of injury,- but they must satisfy the trial judge that
they are qualified from their personal knowledge.41
Switzer v. Weiner, 230 Wis. 599, 601, 284 N.W. 509 (1939).
32 Stetler v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 49 Wis. 609, 6 N.W. 303 (1880);
Flanders v. Cottrell, 36 Wis. 564 (1874).
Z Chapter 363, Wisconsin Laws of 1947.
3 Wigmore. Evidence (3d ed. 1940) sc. 2558. Wigmore contends that the only
sound policy is that both should be proved to the judge.
35 Compare the language of Switzer case, supra, with Hite v. Keene, 149 Wis.
207, 134 N.W. 383 (1912), which was decided before the passage in 1921 of
Section 328.01, Wis. Stats. (1945).386Compare Gebhart v. Homes, 149 Wis. 428, 447, 135 N.W. 860 (1912) with
MacCarthy v. Whitcomb, 110 Wis. 113, 85 N.W. 707 (1901).
z Rape v. Heaton, 9 Wis. 328 (1859), Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co.,
313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941), Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U.S.
386, 30 S.Ct. 292, 54 L.Ed. 530, 25 L.R.A., N.S., 1292 (1910).38 Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931).39 In England the qualified expert must be a member of the legal profession.
40 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) sec. 564.41 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) secs. 668, 690.
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Although the place of the tort governs the liability of the de-
fendant, the sufficiency of the evidence to raise a question for the
jury is determined by Wisconsin law.
"While the liability of the defendant is to be determined by
the laws of Minnesota, the law of the forum governs the proof
in court of the facts alleged. In other words, the sufficiency of
the evidence to raise an issue for the jury is to be determined
by the law of Wisconsin".4
Even where the lex loci delicti demands that questions of fact
should always be left to the jury, if the facts are clearly proven and
there is no real dispute bearing on the question, it is for the Wis-
consin court to say as a matter of law how the issue shuold be de-
cided.43 Thus the right to recover and the extent of liability are
substantive matters to be determined by the lex loci delicti, and evi-
dential matters are procedural and governed by the lex fori. This
latter classification is applicable to the power of the judge to sum up
evidence or comment on the evidence.
The Statute of Limitations4 4 is considered procedural by the Wis-
consin court, and the requirement of the statute is a condition pre-
cedent to bringing suit.45 Thus if the action to recover is not brought
within two years after the happening of the event, even if the lex loci
delicti has a longer statutory period, the plaintiff is barred from the
Wisconsin courts." The period of limitation of actions of the forum
determines whether the plaintiff is barred by lapse of time, not the
law where the cause of action arose.47
The Wisconsin court has rejected the doctrine of forum non
conveniens,4 holding that the privileges and immunities clause of
42 Hutzler v. McDonnell, supra. The court cited with approval, Restatement,
Conflict of Laws (1934) sec. 595. This is one of the few cases where the
court has referred to the Restatement. Has counsel been guilty of omission in
the briefs? d
4' Bourestom v. Bourestom, 231 Wis. 666, 673, 285 N.W. 426 (1939). Also see
Edmund M. Morgan, judicial Notice, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 269 (1944).
44Section 330.19, Wis. Stats. (1945).
45 Trochansky v. Milwaukee Electric Rwy. & Light Co., 110 Wis. 570, 86 N.W.
156 (1901) ; Voss v. Tittel, 219 Wis. 175, 262 N.W. 579 (1935).
46 But see: Lorenzen, "The Statute of Limitations and the Conflict of Laws,"
28 Yale L. j. 492 (1919).
4 Compare: Krisor v. Watts, 61 F. Supp. 845 (1945). judge Duffey held the
plaintiff was not barred in the Wisconsin Federal District Court, although he
would have been barred in the Wisconsin courts on an Illinois accident. Sub-
mitted this decision is wrong in light of the extension given Erie Rr. v. Tomp-
kins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938) in
Sampson v. Channell, 110 F. 2d 754, 128 A.L.R. 394 (1940), certiorari denied,
310 U.S. 650, 60 S.Ct. 1099, 84 L. Ed. 1415 (1940), and in Guaranty Trust Co.
of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 89 L. Ed. 2079, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 160 A.L.R.
1231 (1944).
4Blair, "The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law,"
29 Col. L. Rev. 1 (1929). The New York courts have applied the doctrine in
suits based on tort when the action arose outside the state between non-resi-
dents. Gregonis v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 235 N. Y. 152, 139 N.E.
223, 32 A.L.R. 6 (1923).
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the United States Constitution (art. IV, sec. 2) requires the court to
retain jurisdiction of all actions brought by nonresident natural per-
sons,49 although the United States Supreme Court has officially sanc-
tioned the doctrine. 0 When a Wisconsin Supreme Court, on applica-
tion of the plaintiff, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction by
mandamus will compel the lower court to proceed with the trial6
IV. CAPACITY
The capacity of a party to bring suit may be governed by the
forum, by the domicile or by the place of wrong. In Wisconsin
-whether the party has capacity to sue is determined by the place of
wrong. These cases most frequently arise in husband and wife situa-
tions where, either by the law of the marital domicile or by the law
of the place of wrong, a wife is unable to sue her husband for personal
injuries. In Wisconsin a wife can maintain an action against her
husband for injuries sustained in a Wisconsin auto accident caused
by her husband's negligence. a husband, on the other hand, until
194753 could not sue his wife for negligence.5 Several cases stress
Wisconsin's adherence to the general rule in conflicts that the forum
will apply the law of the state where the accident happened.
1) H and W are domiciled in State A, where the wrongful death
statute gives W no right of action for her husband's death. H is
injured in Wisconsin and dies in State A. W may successfully sue
under the Wisconsin wrongful death statute in the Wisconsin courts. 65
"The place of wrong is in the state where the last event necessary
to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place".66
2) W brings action against H in a Wisconsin court for personal
injuries sustained while a passenger in H's automobile. The acci-
dent was a State A where 'a wife may not bring suit for personal
49 Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Rwy. Co. v. McGinley, 175 Wis. 565, 185 N.W.
218 (1922). The Wisconsin court extends the rejection of the doctrine to non-
resident corporations, giving them the same rights in her courts as resident
corporations; Sections 182.02(2) and 226.11, Wis. Stats. place the court under
this compulsion. State ex rel Smith v. Belden, 205 Wis. 158, 236 N.W. 542(1931).50 Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, 285 U.S. 413, 52 S.Ct. 413, 76
L. Ed. 837 (1932).
State ex rel. Smith v. Belden, mspra, clarifying the doubts in State ex rel.
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Fowler, 196 Wis. 451, 220 N.W. 534 (1928).
52 Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475, 210 N.W. 822 (1926).
53Section 246.075 has been created by Chapter 164, Wisconsin Laws of 1947, and
permits a husband to recover damages from his wife for injuries sustained to
his person by her wrongful act or neglect.54Fehr v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 246 Wis. 228, 16 N.W.(2d) 787 (19445).
55 The Wisconsin statute is applicable because the death was caused in this state.
Rudiger v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Rwy. Co., 94 Wis. 191,
68 N.W. 661 (1896).56 Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) sec. 377.
19471
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
injuries against her husband. After the commencement of the action,
but prior to the date of trial, H and W were married. W has no
right to bring the actionY7
3) W sues her husband's employer for injuries received while
riding as a guest in the defendant's truck. The accident was in State A
where a wife may not bring suit for personal injuries against her
husband. There are no decisions in State A determining if a wife
may sue her husband's employer. The Wisconsin court decides in
favor of W, citing Wisconsin cases to resolve the issue of the host-
guest relationship and the ultra vires character of the transaction."s
4) W is injured in State A, where the wrongful death statute
prohibits the bringing of an action in State A for death occurring
outside thereof. This statute does not prohibit W from suing suc-
cessfully in the Wisconsin courts which must accept jurisdiction under
the privileges and immunities clause of the United States Constitution
(art. IV, sec. 2).11
5) Husband and Wife are residents of State A, where a wife
cannot maintain an action of tort against her husband. W is injured
in a Wisconsin accident, and brings suit in Wisconsin. W may re-
cover.
60
6) Husband and Wife are domiciled in State A, where a wife
cannot maintain an action of tort against her husband. The accident
occurs in State B, where a wife can sue her husband in tort. W can
sue H successfully in the Wisconsin courts.
61
7) W brings suit in Wisconsin against her husband and two
others, alleging they conspired in State A to damage her. Because
in Wisconsin there is no civil action for conspiracy, the Wisconsin
court will find in favor of H.62 But the suit will be dismissed without
prejudice, and W may successfully sue in a jurisdiction which recog-
nizes the action for conspiracy.
5 Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931). This is Wisconsin's
most famous conflicts case, and although the Wisconsin court may have mis-
interpreted Illinois law, it remains authority for the proposition that the ca-
pacity to sue is governed by the lex loci delicti. Noted in: 6 Wis. L. Rev. 103
(1931), 1943 Wis. L. Rev. 145, 166 (1943), 1944 Wis. L. Rev. 128 (1944), 31
Col. L. Rev. 884 (1931), 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1138 (1931), 29 Mich. L. Rev. 1072
(1931), 79 Pa. L. Rev. 804 (1931).58 Hensel v. Hensel Yellow Cab. Co., 209 Wis. 489, 245 N.W. 159 (1944).
59 Sheean v. Lewis, 218 Wis. 588, 260 N.W. 633 (1935).
60 Forbes v. Forbes, 226 Wis. 477, 277 N.W. 112 (1938).
61 "But the cause of action is transitory and citizens of other states have the
same right to bring such action here as citizens of Wisconsin have." Bourestom
v. Bourestom, 231 Wis. 666, 670, 285 N.W. 426 (1939).
62 Singer v. Singer, 245 Wis. 191, 14 N.W. (2d) 43 (1944).
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V. THE UNKNOWN AND THE KNOWN
In the previous sections of this article the general tenets have been
discussed with little practical application to the ordinary situation
confronting the practitioner. Although the terminology and classifica-
tions already defined should be an aid, enunciation to particular sets
of facts should facilitate simplification in reference.
Almost all of the Wisconsin cases have involved railroad or auto-
mobile injuries sustained in another jurisdiction, with the result that
many questions have not been decided by the Wisconsin court. It is
axiomatic that the forum will not execute the penal laws of another,63
yet we have had no occasion to determine what would be considered
penal in the international sense by the Wisconsin court. We have
recognized the precept that we will redress foreign wrongs except
when opposed to our public policy, yet we only know that a clause in
a telegraph blank that the defendant "shall not be liable for . . .
delays in transmission or delivery . . . of any unrepeated mes-
sage beyond the amount received for sending the same," is contra
to our public policy.64 How far does this exception extend? Or-
dinarily, a court will not take jurisdiction of a case arising out of a
trespass upon land in another state,65 but will the Wisconsin court
feel compelled under the privileges and immunities clause of the
United States Constitution to accept such suits?66 If the issue were
relevant, would the modern Wisconsin court hold "the measure of
damages for a tort is determined by the law of the place of wrong"?'
With the decisions at our disposal, an imaginary automobile journey
may serve to illustrate the Conflict of the Law of Torts in Wisconsin.6
A, an Illinois resident, and B, a Minnesota resident, decide to
journey in B's automobile from Milwaukee to Oklahoma City. While
travelling through Minnesota, B negligently drives off the road and
A is injured. If the suit were brought in Wisconsin, the distinction
between a passenger and guest, and the measure of care demanded
of a host, would be determined by Minnesota law. The law of the
place in which the accident occured governs the rights and liabilities,
63 See, generally: Leflar, "Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental
Claims," 46 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1932).6 4 Fox v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 138 Wis. 648, 120 N.W. 399 (1909) ; com-
pare, Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) sec. 414.
65 Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., 158 U.S. 105, 15 S. Ct. 771 (1895) ; Restate-
ment, Conflict of Laws (1934) secs. 614, 615.
66 Little v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co., 65 Minn. 48, 67 N.W.
846 (1896).
67 Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) sec. 412; see, Sweet v. Chicago & N.W.
Ry. Co., 157 Wis. 400, 147 N.W. 1054 (1914). Exemplary damages were not
considered "penal" in Daury v. Ferraro, 108 Conn. 386, 143 Atl. 630 (1928)
and Wallman v. Mead, 93 Vt. 322, 107 Atl. 396 (1919).
68 See, generally: Page, "Conflict of Law Problems in Automobile Accidents,"
1943 Wis. L. Rev. 145 (1943).
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rather than the law in which the guest became a guest or the law of
the state in which suit is brought.6 9
In Oklahoma, B negligently hits another car driven by his wife.
Although in Minnesota, the marital domicile, a wife cannot maintain
an action of tort against her husband, since she has capacity to sue
in Oklahoma, the Wisconsin court will permit the suit. If contribu-
tory negligence will bar the wife's recovery in Oklahoma, the Wis-
consin court will not apply its own Doctrine of Comparative Negli-
gence, but will give the same effect to contributory negligence as the
place of the accident. 70
On the return journey A and B remain overnight in Duluth, Min-
nesota. B lends his car to A, who drives to Superior, Wisconsin to
visit a friend. While in Wisconsin, A is stalled on the highway, and
telephones B informing him of his plight. B sends C, a garageman
normally in his employ, from Duluth. C has an accident in Wisconsin.
Whether C is considered B's agent or an independent contractor is
determined by Wisconsin law, because the Wisconsin court will give
no extraterritorial effect to any Minnesota statute. The determination
for vicarious liability depends upon the law of the state in which the
accident takes place.7 '
It thus appears that Wisconsin is in line with the majority view
that the lex loci delicti determines whether a person has sustained
a legal injury, whether a person has capacity to sue, whether a person
is responsible for the torts of another and whether an automobile
passenger has assumed the risk of the driver's negligence. "Fairness
demands that once one's rights and liabilities are settled under the
law, those same rights and liabilities shall be the measure of legal
obligation everywhere".7 2 By giving an injured plaintiff no greater
or less rights than he would have in the forum where the injury
occurred, the Wisconsin court puts no premium on using her judicial
machinery, yet this same impartiality benefits the plaintiff who only
can secure service on the defendant within the jurisdiction.
VI. COROLLARY PROBLEMS
Directly related to Conflict of Torts are two problems which have
not been emphasized because they involve both contract and tort.
These are separate fields which demand more elaboration than the
length of this article permits, but which should not be eliminated
completely in any treatment of the general subject.
69 Jensen v. Jensen, 228 Wis. 77, 279 N.W. 628 (1938) ; Switzer v. Weiner, 230
Wis. 599, 284 N.W. 509 (1939) ; Hutzler v. McDonnell, 239 Wis. 568, 2 N.W.
(2d) 207 (1942), affirmed 242 Wis.. 256, 7 N.W. (2d) 835 (1943).
70 Bourestom v. Bourestom, 231 Wis. 666, 285 N.W. 426 (1939).
71 Zowin v. Peoples Brewing Co., 225 Wis. 120, 273 N.W. 466 (1937).
72 Goodrich, "Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts," 36 W. Va. L. Q. 156 (1930).
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A. Joinder of Policyholder and Insurer as Parties Defendant"'
Under the common law, a joinder of the insurer and insured was
clearly improper because the action against the insurer was in con-
tract, and the action against the insured was in tort: under the Wis-
consin Statutes,7" such joinder is allowed. The Conflicts problem
arises when the third party claimant has no claim against the insurer
under a "no-action" clause, until a final judgment has been recovered
against the insured. Normally courts will not disregard the provision
because it places upon the insurer a greater obligation than that con-
tracted for, resulting in an impairment of contract between the parties,
contrary to Section 10, Article I of the United States Constitution, and
Section 12, Article I of the Wisconsin Constitution."5 What effect
then is given Section 260.11, Wisconsin Statutes?
Normally procedure, or the form of remedy, is governed by the
lex fori: substance, or matter of right, is governed by the law of the
place of the transaction. In resolving the distinction between sub-
stance and procedure, the Wisconsin court has held the right to join
the insured and insurer as parties defendant under the statute is a
matter of procedure to be governed by the lex fori,76 although the
results of Wisconsin decisions tend more to demonstrate the statute
confers a substantive right which is governed by the lex contractus.
No extraterritorial effect is given the statute when the policy has
been issued outside the state, but when Wisconsin is the lex fori and
lex contractus, it matters not what the lex delicti may be. For Wis-
consin insurance contracts the third party claimant is treated the
same as a third party beneficiary, and suit may be brought against
the insurer alone, with no requirement of notifying or serving the
insured. Applications of these general tenets are found in the follow-
ing illustrations:
1) D, a State A resident, took out an accident policy with a
"no-action" clause written in State A with I, insurance Company.
In a Wisconsin accident, D injured P, who brought suit in a Wis-
consin court joining D and I as parties defendant. I filed a plea in
abatement, which the lower court overruled. The Supreme Court
reversed, deciding the statute did not apply to this case."7
7I In general, see: 22 Marq. L. Rev. 75 (1938) ; 12 Wis. L. Rev. 531 (1937) ; 20
Marq. L. Rev. 158 (1936).
74 Section 260.11, Wis. Stats. (1945).
11 Byerly v. Thorp, 221 Wis. 28, 265 N.W. 76 (1936); 20 Marq. L. Rev. 158(1936); 12 Wis. L. Rev. 531, 536 (1937).
76 "Matters pertaining to the form in which the action is brought would seem
clear instances of what relates to remedy, to be settled by the lex fori." Oertel
v. Williams, 214 Wis. 68, 251 N.W. 465 (1934).
7 Byerly v. Thorpe, supra, Kilocyn v. Trausch, 222 Wis. 528, 269 N.W. 276
(1936).
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2) I, insurance company, issued in Wisconsin a policy with a
"no-action" clause to a Wisconsin resident before the enactment of
the statute. In a Wisconsin accident, D injured P, who brought suit
in the Wisconsin courts joining D and I as parties defendant. The Su-
preme Court held that the Wisconsin statute was effective only against
those policies entered into subsequent to the adoption of the statute7 8
3) D, a Wisconsin corporation, was insured in Wisconsin by I,
a State A insurance company. The policy contained a "no-action"
clause and another clause which made void any provisions which
conflicted with any statutory law. P, the injured plaintiff, success-
fully joined D and I. The court held the "no-action" clause was void
from the very terms of the policy. Thus the interpretation of a
personal contract is referable to the place where it is made.7 9
4) I, an insurance company, issued a policy in Wisconsin to D,
a Wisconsin resident. P was injured by D in a State A accident. The
court allowed P to bring suit only against I in Wisconsin, deciding
that the forum rather than the lex loci delicti would govern the ques-
tion of joinder.80 Thus State A law, which would not permit such
joinder or splitting of a cause of action, was inoperative on these
facts, and when the Wisconsin court decided the pleading under the
statute was procedural, it necessarily concluded there was no impair-
ment of the right of contract.
5) In an action brought in Wisconsin to recover damages for the
death of her husband in a State A accident caused by the alleged
negligence of D, P joined I, the insurer of D. The decedant was a
State A resident; D was a Wisconsin resident who contracted with
a State B corporation for the policy in Wisconsin. State A did not
permit an action in State A for death occurring outside the state;
Wisconsin had no such law. Despite the "no-action" clause in the
policy, and the embargo provisions of State A law, the Wisconsin
court held Section 260.11, Wisconsin Statutes operative by permitting
the joinder.61
78 Pawlowski v. Eskofski, 209 Wis. 189, 244 N.W. 611 (1932) ; 20 Marq. L. Rev.
158 (1936). If the retroactive test determines whether a statute is substantive
or procedural, how can the Wisconsin court hold Section 260.11. Wis. Stats.
to be procedural? See, Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 24 S.Ct. 692, 48 L. Ed.
1067 (1904).
7 International Harvester Co. v. McAdams, 142 Wis. 114, 124 N.W. 1042 (1910).
80 Oertel v. Williams, supra; 1944 Wis. L. Rev. 133 (1944) ; 22 Marq. L. Rev. 75
1938) ; Lorenzen, Cases on Conflict of Laws (4th ed. 1937) 376; Restatement,
Conflict of Laws (1934) sec. 592, comment (a); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws(2d ed. 1938) 191; Elliot v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America, 210
Wis. 445, 230 N.W. 87 (1930).
81 Sheehan v. Lewis, 218 Wis. 588, 260 N.W. 633 (1935); 10 Wis. L. Rev. 78
(1934); 11 Wis. L. Rev. 46 (1935); 22 Marq. L. Rev. 75, 84 (1938).
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B. Workmen's Compensation-
Under the common law the question whether an employee could
recover from his employer in tort was contingent upon the law where
the injury occurred, although between 187583 and 19044 Wisconsin
refused access to her courts for extraterritorial injuries where the
cause of action was a statutory right conferred by the lex loci delicti.
By reason of a Workmen's Act, 5 an employer is responsible for
bodily harm to his employees arising out of and in the course of their
employment and irrespective of the negligence or wilful fault of
either the employer or employee. The Wisconsin court has rejected
the contract explanation in interpreting the result that the Wisconsin
statute is applicable to an accident without the state, 6 yet the de-
cisions chiefly rest on the contract relationship, the incidents of which
may be defined by the place of entering into it.1 In a recent Wis-
consin Law Review article8 s this explanation was offered:
"The theory of the Compensation Act was to charge the loss,
fixed by statute, caused by industrial accident irrespective of
the cause (self-inflicted only excepted), to the cost of the
product. Under this plan the burden falls upon society at large,
and is not borne entirely either by the employer or by the em-
ployee. The liability of the employer under the act is not tor-
tious and is not contractual in the sense that it should be con-
sidered as a covenant or part of the contract, but it is purely
statutory. The liability of the employer under the act being
statutory, the act enters into and becomes part of the contract,
not as a covenant thereof, but to the extent that the law of the
land is a part of every contract."
The Conflict of Laws questions with regard to the Act have called
forth many decisions, a few of which will be demonstrated by the
following examples:
1) W, a Wisconsin resident, contracts in Wisconsin with C, a
Wisconsin corporation, to work half-time in Wisconsin and half-time
in State A. W is injured in State A and can recover in Wisconsin."
83 See, generally: Dwan, "Workmen's Compensation and the Conflict of Laws,"
11 Minn. L. Rev. 329 (1927); Dwan, "Workmen's Compensation and the Con-
flict of Laws-the Restatement and Other Recent Developments," 20 Minn. L.
Rev. 19 (1935); Dunlap, "The Conflict of Laws and Workmen's Compensa-
tion," 23 Calif. L. Rev. 381 (1935).
84 Anderson v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Rwy. Co., 37 Wis. 321 (1875).
85 Bain v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 120 Wis. 412, 98 N.W. 241 (1904).86 Bain v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 120 Wis. 412, 98 N.W. 241 (1904).
88 Chapter 102, Wis. Stats. (1945).
87 Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., 169 Wis. 106, 170 N.W. 275, 171 N.W. 935
(1919).
88 C. J. Oten, Workmen's Compensation-Conflict of Laws, 1947 Wis. L. Rev.
139, 140. This is an excellent review of the general principles and the Wisconsin
rules of interpretation of Chapter 102, Wis. Stats. (1945).
89 Threshermen's Nat. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 201 Wis.
303, 230 N.W. 67 (1930).
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Thus if the employer and employee are Wisconsin residents, who
therein formulate their contract, the act is inferred within the con-
tract, and it is immaterial where the injury occurs.
2) W, a Wisconsin resident, contracts in Wisconsin with C, a
Wisconsin corporation, to work full-time in State A. W is injured in
State A and can recover in Wisconsin."0
3) W, a resident of State A, contracts in Wisconsin with C, a
Wisconsin corporation, to work full-time in State A. W is injured in
State A and cannot recover in Wisconsin. 91 This case emphasizes the
importance of the employee's residency when the work is to be per-
formed outside Wisconsin.
4) W, a resident of State A, contracts in State A with C, a
State A corporation, to work in Wisconsin. W is injured in Wiscon-
sin and can recover in Wisconsin.9 2 Thus the act is applicable to
every injury in Wisconsin, without regard to residency or the place
where the employment contract was made.
5) W, a 'resident of State A, contracts in State A with C, a
State A corporation, to work in Wisconsin. W normally works in
Wisconsin but is injured while temporarily outside the state in the
course of his employment. W can recover in Wisconsin.93 This ex-
tension demonstrates that the place where the service is to be per-
formed is a controlling factor.
6) W, a resident of State A, can recover in State A under her
statute and can also qualify under the Wisconsin Act. Proceedings
may be brought in Wisconsin. 94
7) W, a State A employee, is injured in Wisconsin and is free
to pursue his remedy in either state. The State A Workmen's Com-
pensation Act provides that any lump sum settlement accepted by the
injured employee will bar him from seeking recovery under another
act. W seeks redress in State A and receives a lump sum settlement.
He now pursues his remedy before the Wisconsin Industrial Com-
mission, but cannot recover.9 5
8) W, a State B employee, is injured in Wisconsin and is free
to pursue his remedy in either state. The State B Workmen's Coin-
90 Wisconsin Bridge and Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 222
Wis. 194, 268 N.W. 134 (1936).
9' Wandersee v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 198 Wis. 345, 223 N.W.
837 (1929).92 Interstate Power Co. v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 203 Wis. 466, 234
N.W. 889 (1931).
9 Salvation Army v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 219 Wis. 343, 263
N.W. 349, 101 A.L.R. 1440 (1935).4 Jutton-Kelly Co. v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 220 Wis. 127, 264
N.W. 630 (1936).95 Magnolia Peroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 64 S.Ct. 208, 88 L. Ed. 149, 150
A.L.R. 413 (1943).
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pensation Act has no provision concerning the extraterritorial effect
of a State B award. W seeks redress in State B and receives a lump
sum settlement. The settlement contract provides, "This settlement
does not effect any rights that the applicant may have under the
Workmen's Compensation Act of Wisconsin." The Wisconsin Com-
mission grants credit against its award for the amount paid under the
State B award. W now pursues his remedy before the Wisconsin
Industrial Commission, and is entitled to any amount which is de-
termined to be more than his State B award."
96 Industrial Commission of Wisconsin v. McCartin, - U.S. -, 67 S. Ct. 886
(1947), overruling McCartin v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 248 Wis.
570, 22 N.W. (2d) 522 (1946). The Wisconsin court believed Magnolia
Petrolium Co. v. Hunt, supra, controlled to the extent that the "full faith and
credit" clause demanded that any lump sum settlement made the matter res
adjudicata. The importance of the law of the state where the first award was
given, was not magnified in the Magnolia Petrolium case. See: 1947 Wis. L.
Rev. 139, 144.
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